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Melindungi Pelayan daripada Serangan Naptha dengan Menggunakan 
Kaedah Pengesahan Awal Pelanggan 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Serangan Naptha bertujuan mengganggu layanan TCP yang ditawarkan oleh 
sesuatu pelayan dengan menjanakan banyak sambungan palsu terhadap pelayan 
tersebut. Pelayan sasaran termasuklah pelayan capaian selamat, pelayan mel, 
pelayan laman web dan pelayan fail. Pelayan-pelayan ini biasanya membuka satu 
proses atau satu talian untuk setiap permintaan yang ditubuhkan, sama ada 
permintaan itu sah atau tidak. Sebaik sahaja had maksimum proses atau had 
maksimum talian tercapai, permintaan baru akan ditutup dan digugurkan. Dengan itu, 
serangan Naptha juga merupakan sejenis serangan penolakan layanan. Dalam kajian 
ini, kami mengutarakan kaedah pengesahan awal pelanggan dalam usaha untuk 
melindungi pelayan daripada serangan Naptha. Kaedah ini menampal jurang di antara 
penubuhan sambungan dan pengesahan pelanggan, di mana ia wujud dalam 
pelaksanaan TCP masa kini. Kelebihan kaedah pengesahan yang dicadangkan ialah 
mudah, cekap dan ia tidak memperkenalkan transaksi tambahan di antara pelanggan 
dan pelayan. Keputusan daripada mesin ujian kami menunjukkan kaedah pengesahan 
awal pelanggan adalah cekap dalam menguruskan serangan Naptha sewaktu 
melayani pelanggannya. 
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DEFENDING SERVERS AGAINST NAPTHA ATTACK BY USING AN EARLY 
CLIENT AUTHENTICATION METHOD 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Naptha attack aims to disrupt TCP service a server provides by generating 
large amount of forged connections to the server. The targeted server includes secure 
shell server, mail server, web server and file server. These servers typically create one 
process or one thread for each established incoming request regardless of whether the 
client is legitimate or not. Once the maximum process limit or thread limit is reached, 
new request will be closed and dropped. Hence, Naptha attack is also a Denial of 
Service attack. In this research, we propose Early Client Authentication Method (ECAM) 
in defending server that required client login against Naptha DoS attack. This method 
patches the gap between connection establishment and client validation which appears 
in current TCP implementation. The advantages of the proposed authentication method 
are simple, efficient and it does not introduce additional transaction between client and 
server. Results show that the proposed ECAM is capable in handling the attack on our 
test machine while continue serving its client. 
 
 xi
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
There are two known Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) stack attacks, 
namely TCP SYN attack and Naptha attack. Both attacks prevent legitimate users from 
using TCP services on a server and therefore, are categorized under Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks. Before in depth explanation on Naptha attack is carried out, we first 
describe the threat of DoS attacks. 
 
1.1  Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are exploits which could bring services to be 
temporary unavailable or permanently disabled until recovery actions are taken. Unlike 
intrusion attack, DoS attacks aim to disrupt services a server provides. These attacks 
may last for a few minutes to several hours. During this period, the targeted victim is 
either not responding to any request or experiencing significant drop in performance.  
 
DoS attacks had successfully brought down several well-known web servers in 
the early of 21st century. Yahoo, CNN, Amazon and e-Bay were among the victims of 
the attacks (David, 2000). According to Symantec Internet Security Threat Report in 
2005: In the first half of 2005, the number of DoS attacks has grew by more than 680% 
from 119 attacks per day to 927 attacks per day on average (Symantec, 2005); for the 
next six months, Symantec detected an average of 1,402 DoS attacks per day which is 
an increase of 51% from the first half of 2005 (Symantec, 2006).  
 
Ever since the first wide spread DoS attack was discovered in 1988 (Mell and 
Wack, 2000), new exploit emerges in exponential order. Numerous researches had 
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been done in recent years, and counter measurements were proposed. Some of the 
techniques effectively mitigate these attacks but none could stop it completely. 
 
DoS attacks could be classified into two major categories: vulnerability attacks, 
and flooding attacks. In the first type of attacks, attacker exploits system’s security hole 
to force the targeted victim to reboot, crash, shutdown or freeze. Ping of Death, 
software exploits and teardrop are examples of vulnerability attacks. Normally, a simple 
system update is sufficient to patch the security hole. 
 
For flooding attacks, attacker consumes all resources on a targeted victim and 
thus prevents it to continue serving its clients. Resources here could be bandwidth, 
CPU, memory, process table, buffer or anything that is limited and consumable. Under 
these attacks, even the finest system could be a victim. In flooding attacks, attacker 
sends large amount of traffics to the victim with the goal to deplete victim’s resources. 
The victim is unable to differentiate between the attack traffics and normal traffics in 
this situation, all traffics look alike. The victim could not simply filter out particular 
traffics because this might drop legitimate users too. This is the main reason why DoS 
attacks still remain as a threat until today. The situation becomes worse when a few 
exploits are bundled and wide spread. Anyone could download and launch a large 
attack without having to understand how it actually operates. 
 
Flooding attacks often involve zombies because one attacker alone is not 
enough to deplete victim’s resources. All the zombies together form a network which is 
listening to the attacker and they will start flooding the targeted victim upon receiving 
the correct command. A DoS attack which originates from more than one source is 
known as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. The scale of DDoS attacks 
depend on the number of zombies that participate in the exploits. With enough 
zombies, any server could be a victim. Due to its effectiveness, DDoS attacks are 
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known as major threats in network security communities. More information could be 
found by referring to Mirkovic et al. (2005) and Handley & Rescorla (2006). 
 
1.2 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Naptha Attack 
 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a connection oriented protocol, which 
designed to provide reliable connection over the Internet (Postel, 1981). This protocol 
uses sequence number to detect lost or duplicated packets and to determine the next 
expected packet. Retransmission of packet is done automatically when a connection 
timed out to ensure the user at the other end could receive all information he sent. 
Most of the services we use everyday rely on TCP, such as web browsing using Hyper 
Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), file exchange using File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and 
email service using Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP).  
 
 
 
 
ESTABLISHED, 
ALLOCATE TCB 
& CREATE CHILD 
PROCESS 
SYN
SYN, ACK
ACK
   CLIENT               SERVER
ESTABLISHED 
CLIENT LOGIN  
PROCESS 
CREATE PROCESS 
& ALLOCATE TCB 
Figure 1.1: Three-way Handshake, Resources Allocation, and Client Login Process 
 
 
A TCP communication begins with three-way handshake. First, the client 
(indicator) sends a connection request to server (responder) using a SYN 
(synchronization) packet. Then the server responses packet with SYN and ACK 
(acknowledgement) flags on. After the server receives an acknowledgement from the 
client, connection is established. A new child process will be created at the server to 
handle client requests and information such as the incoming IP address, outgoing IP 
 3
address, incoming port number, outgoing port number and sequence number will be 
kept in TCP Control Block (TCB). A graphical representation of three-way handshake, 
resources allocation and client login procedures is shown in Figure 1.1. In current login 
server communication, client login process starts after the connection establishment. 
Since the client stays anonymously while resources were allocated, it can be easily 
exploited and resources can be consumed. 
 
 
 
 SYN from attacker using spoofed IP
Attacker captures SYN, ACK
Attacker replies the ACK
SPOOFED CLIENT    ATTACKER       SERVER 
ESTABLISHED, 
ALLOCATE TCB 
& CREATE CHILD 
PROCESS 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Naptha Attack 
 
 
In Naptha attack, attacker tries to fill up the maximum processes limit by 
generating large army of spurious connections to the targeted victim and leave them 
alive until the TCP session time out. Once the limit is reached, server will drop any new 
incoming connection request. The similarity between Naptha attack and the well-known 
TCP SYN attack is the disruption of TCP services through flooding. The difference is 
that they target different resource. TCP SYN attack tries to exhaust the application’s 
backlog while Naptha attack tries to deplete the maximum processes limit of a system. 
In TCP SYN attack, attacker merely send large amount of crafted SYN packet to victim, 
however, in Naptha attack, the procedures involved are slightly more complex because 
attacker must complete all bogus connections he made as illustrated in Figure 1.2. The 
figure shows that the attacker sits between forged client and server during Naptha 
attack. The spoofed host does not actually exist, but the server who cannot validate 
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this will still establish the connection and allocate resources to the peer. Server that 
creates new thread for each incoming connection denies new incoming request as well 
when the maximum thread limit is reached. 
 
1.3 Research Problem 
 
Although Naptha attacks were discovered and documented since 2000 
(CERT/CC, 2000), the threat still exist. There is no solution to prevent or stop these 
exploits thoroughly. Naptha attack can effectively disable a server for a period of time 
depends on the attacker. Since all attack connections to the server are completely 
identical to normal legitimate connections, it helps to cover the attacker’s track and 
makes prevention harder to achieve. 
 
During Naptha attack, it fills up the victim’s processes limit with crafted hosts. 
Recent operating system tries to mitigate this problem by increasing the total number of 
supported concurrent processes to several thousands and by closing idle connections 
quickly. While this tactic seems to work fine, the threat remains. Even though the 
server could continue to serve during the attack in this situation, CPU power and 
memory usage are wasted to process bogus data and this directly decreases server 
performance. 
 
Internet services nowadays are vulnerable to Naptha attack despite of whether 
the services required user login or not. We proposed Early Client Authentication 
Method (ECAM) to defense servers against Naptha attack. Login information is 
appended to the three-way handshake to allow server to identify the client at 
connection establishment stage. Our primary goal is to prevent resources allocation to 
any forged connections generated by Naptha attack. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of this research are: 
1. To examine the behavior and impact of Naptha attack. 
2. To propose and develop algorithm for ECAM. 
3. To implement and evaluate ECAM. 
 
The first objective of this research is to examine the behavior of Naptha attack. 
This goal focuses on how the attack exploits the TCP stack implementation, the target 
of Naptha attack and its damages to a system. 
 
The next objective is to propose and develop ECAM algorithm. The goal aims to 
prevent resources consumption to unidentified user by authenticate all incoming 
requests at the early stage. Any bogus connections which failed the authentication 
process will not be entertained, and thus fails the attack. 
 
The third objective is to implement and evaluate ECAM. We used OpenBSD, an 
open source operating system, in our research. The default system and ECAM system 
will be tested against Naptha attack. It is expected Internet services that required user 
login will become immune to the attack on an ECAM enabled system. 
 
1.5 Significant of the Research 
 
This research aims to protect TCP services that required user login against 
Naptha DoS attack. The newly proposed ECAM will verify the client before the system 
proceeds to serve him. Bogus incoming requests will eventually be dropped and 
consequently, all active processes and threads are maintained only for clients who had 
login successfully. This method ensures Naptha attack that consumes maximum 
process limit using forged TCP connection will never be succeeded. 
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1.6 Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the background of 
this thesis. It starts by defining Denial of Service attacks and Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks. Then, we describe the current TCP stack problem and Naptha attack. 
The research problem and research objectives are explained next. We discuss the 
significant of our research in section 1.5. 
 
Chapter 2 is a literature review of related protection methods against Naptha 
attack. These methods could generally be divided into two categories, which are the 
filtering mechanism and the prevention mechanism. We concentrate in the prevention 
mechanism because our method falls into this category. We also discuss some other 
immediate defensive methods. 
 
Chapter 3 details our proposed ECAM to protect servers against Naptha attack. 
First, we describe the design of ECAM and the advantages of it compared to the 
current FTP authentication method. The security considerations in ECAM and their 
counter measurements are discussed next in the chapter. The methodology to carry 
out this research is also presented. 
 
Chapter 4 details the ECAM implementation at kernel level and application level 
of both ECAM client and ECAM server. Chapter 5 presents the results and discussions 
of ECAM system and current default system under Naptha attack. Chapter 6 is the final 
chapter of this thesis. It gives a conclusion of ECAM and it also outlines the possible 
future works to enhance the proposed ECAM. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
We described the threat of Naptha attacks in the previous chapter. In this 
chapter, we discuss the related defence techniques from the perspective of TCP stack 
implementation. Researches and counter measurements in this area generally could 
be divided into two categories. The first category concentrates on detection and filtering 
mechanisms. During network monitoring, any detected attack attempt will activate the 
filtering action. The second category concentrates on prevention mechanisms. During 
the development process, the Internet protocol is reviewed and enhanced in order to 
prevent future exploit on the specific protocol. Figure 2.1 below is a graphical 
representation of common defence techniques in TCP stack attacks. Our research falls 
into the second category. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Common Defence Techniques in TCP Stack Attacks 
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2.1 TCP Stack Attacks Detection and Filtering Mechanisms 
 
TCP stack attacks detection techniques often involve statistical modelling of 
incoming and/or outgoing traffics. The traffic collected will be compared to previous 
data in real time and any abnormal behaviour will trigger the alarm. This mechanism is 
suitable to detect large scale of TCP stack attacks in which the attacker tries to flood 
and congest the victim. Two of the most widely used detection methods are entropy 
and Cumulative Sum techniques (CUSUM) (Feinstein et al., 2003). Entropy allows the 
server to measure the randomness of the traffic while the CUSUM can detect any 
abrupt change to the traffic pattern. For example, these methods could be used to 
detect sudden increment of SYN packet, ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) 
packet and ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) packet. Usually, the detection focuses 
on one or more fields in the IP header as targets of monitoring, such as the port 
number, IP address and TCP flags. 
 
DoS attacks detection is not complete without proper reactive action. The 
reactive mechanisms employed depend heavily on the detection techniques and the 
location of the action took place. For example, a stateful filtering mechanism is suitable 
to be implemented at the host base because it required deep inspection during 
detection and precise instructions to filter the traffic. Even a tiny mistake will drop 
legitimate users. Another common technique used by the upstream router is rate-
limiting mechanism which is low resources intended. This approach drops traffic 
exceeded certain threshold. 
 
Naptha attack detection was carried out by Information System Technology 
group (IST) of MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Lincoln laboratory in 1998 
and 1999, categorized under DoS – process table attack. However, the purpose of the 
evaluation on process table was not to protect the server against it but to check against 
the buggy code that might create many connections in rapid fire sequence (Haines et 
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al., 2001). The following quote is picked from the technical report by Haines et al. The 
report stated that the only way to detect process table attack is by monitoring the total 
number of connections reaches the server at a time. 
 
“Because this attack consists of abuse of a perfectly legal action, an intrusion 
detection system trying to detect a Process Table attack will need to use 
somewhat subjective criteria for identifying the attack. The only clue that such 
an attack is occurring is an unusually large number of connections active on a 
particular port. Unfortunately an ‘unusual’ number of connections is different for 
every host … …” (Haines et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
Normally, the challenges faced by this intrusion detection are false positive and 
false negative. Also, the total number of connections handled by a server is different 
from one domain to another, as well as from time to time. Network administrator 
normally set the total number of allowed connections to several percents higher than 
usual incoming requests before the server triggers the alarm. False positive is a 
condition where the detector sounds the alarm but an attack does not take place; this 
happens when there is sudden increase in legitimate users accessing services a server 
provide, called flash crowd. On the other hand, false negative is a condition where the 
detector could not detect a present attack; this occurs if the rate of attack is lower than 
the detection threshold. In order to bypass this detection, the attacker could run a 
series of training to fool the server to increase the threshold limit so that the actual 
attack stays undetected as long as the attacker hold the attack rate well below the limit. 
 
2.2 TCP Stack Attacks Prevention Mechanisms 
 
In TCP stack attacks prevention, developers modified the TCP implementation 
to make the attacks completely unsuccessful or less destructive. Although prevention is 
effective, it might require kernel recompilation. The algorithm developed is often attack 
specific and cannot be used to defend against other type of DoS attack. However, this 
method does mitigate some DoS attacks that are hard or impossible to be differentiated 
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or filtered from daily traffics. Furthermore, well defined prevention technique does not 
produce false positive or false negative. 
 
Since Naptha attack takes place before any authentication process starts, 
attacker normally leave little or no track to be traced. Recent researches in this area 
concentrate on lower layer protection to mitigate similar DoS attacks before a 
connection is established. Some examples are: Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) used 
by Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) and computational intensive puzzle used by Host 
Identification Protocol (HIP). 
 
We describe Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) in section 2.2.1 and computational 
intensive puzzle in section 2.2.2. Both techniques are designed to be implemented at 
network layer and transport layer respectively to protect system against DoS attacks. 
CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans 
Apart) at application layer is explained in 2.2.3, while section 2.2.4 briefly discusses 
other defensive methods. 
 
2.2.1 Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) 
 
Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) is a protocol used to negotiate, set up and 
maintain security associations (SAs) (Kaufman, 2005). A SA contains shared security 
information needed by IPSec to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, anti-
replay, connectionless integrity, and limited traffic flow confidentiality (Kent & Seo, 
2005). Figure 2.2 shows the initial exchange of IKEv2 and the notations are listed in 
Table 2.1. In the first two transactions, the initiator and the responder agree on a set of 
cryptographic suite, and the following messages flow between them will be encrypted 
and integrity protected. Integrity protection assured that unauthorized alteration of data 
in the middle of transaction will be detected. 
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 HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni
HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ] 
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] 
               AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr} 
HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr} 
Initiator Responder  
Figure 2.2: Initial Exchange of IKEv2 
 
 
Table 2.1: Notation in IKEv2 
 
Notation Description 
AUTH Authentication 
CERT Certificate 
CERTREQ Certificate Request 
HDR IKE Header 
ID Identification 
KE Key Exchange 
Ni, Nr Nonce 
SA Security Association 
SK{ … } Payload in brackets are encrypted and integrity protected 
TSi, TSr Traffic Selector 
 
 
 
In the third and forth transactions, identification payload and optional certificate 
payload are used together with authentication field to assert peer’s identity. This is very 
important because when we browse the Internet, there is no guarantee that the URL 
(Universal Resource Locator) we typed will always point to the location we want. 
Sometime it gets redirected to somewhere else. Normally, an attacker will try to redirect 
the user to a location that mimic the original web site (called a phishing site), so that 
when the user keyed in the username, password and credit card number, the attacker 
could steal them. The certificate is used to verify the genuineness of identification 
payload and it relies on the third trusted person, called Certificate Authority (CA) to 
provide the verification. 
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IKEv2 together with IPSec provide solutions to many security problems that 
haunted the network administrator for many years. However, a network administrator 
should not rely on IPSec completely, because there is no guarantee that all hosts 
inside the network will never be compromised. A host could easily be inflected through 
external source such as thumb drive, or laptop which plugged into various network. An 
attacker could also get through when the user browses some malicious web site, 
opened email attachment or received file from peer during chatting. The inflected host 
that we mentioned will be able to attack any machine through an IPSec link because 
IPSec blocks traffic based on rules in the configuration and it does not know how to 
block an inflected host dynamically. 
 
Current deployment of IKEv2 requires the privileged root user to manually set 
up the configurations such as IP address, encryption algorithms, and security policy at 
both initiator and responder in order to communicate securely. There would be no 
problem if IKEv2 were to be established between two known gateways permanently, 
such as between two campuses or between two offices remotely. In a client-server 
communication however, if a user wishes to login into an email server but the server is 
not included as an allowed IPSec peer; then, there will be no protection on that 
connection. Password, credit card number and all other information transmitted will be 
sent in plaintext and be revealed to the attacker in this case. 
 
2.2.2 Computational Intensive Puzzle 
 
Computational intensive puzzle is a challenge-response test aims to be 
executed automatically between the server and client. The solution to the puzzle acts 
as a proof of work or proof of existence challenge. There are some different proposals 
on the implementation of computation intensive puzzle as suggested by Host 
Identification Protocol (Moskowitz et at. 2007), Client Puzzles (Juels & Brainard, 1999) 
and Puzzle TCP (McNevin et al., 2004). Generally, the server sends challenge on 
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second handshake and the client reply in third handshake, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
Initially, the client has to send a service request to the server, then the server reply with 
a challenge or puzzle back to the client. Basically, the host machine must do some 
computation, such as add, subtract, multiply, divide and modulus, in order to solve the 
puzzle and send the result back to the server. The client will be granted permission to 
access the service if the result is correct or be rejected if the result is wrong. As 
explained in chapter 1, DoS attacks aims to deplete the TCB so that it drops further 
service request. The purpose of this puzzle challenge is to delay the automate attack 
generated by an attacker because it must solve the puzzle in order to have an entry in 
TCB. 
 
 
 
 INITIATE 
CHALLENGE_REQUEST 
CHALLENGE_REPLY
Client Server  
Figure 2.3: Exchange of Computational Intensive Puzzle 
 
 
The limitations faced by this method are the determination of which puzzle to be 
used due to the processing power of the personal computer nowadays vary in wide 
range. Some machines can solve a puzzle rapidly whereas some are slower. The 
system might drop legitimate client who uses slower machine, either because the TCB 
is filled up by the other fast machines or the session timed out before the client could 
solve the challenge. 
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2.2.3 Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and 
Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) 
 
CAPTCHA is an application layer challenge-response test used to prevent 
automated attack. This test consists of distorted alphabetical letters which is 
considered hard to be recognized by machines. The user must enter the correct phrase 
as displayed in order to proceed. Some examples are shown in Figure 2.4. This 
protection technique has been widely implemented in public services such as during 
creation of new email account at Yahoo, Gmail and Hotmail. 
 
 
 
Hotmail 
Yahoo 
File Storage Server A
PARC 
Wikimedia 
CAPTCHA 
File Storage Server B Ejeliot 
 
Figure 2.4: Example of CAPTCHA Used on Web Server 
 
 
CAPTCHA successfully introduces some degree of difficulties to the attacker. 
The effectiveness of CAPTCHA in differentiate crafted connection from daily traffic 
depends on the algorithm employed. There are many CAPTHA algorithms already 
broke by the attackers and there will be more. 
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2.3 Other Defensive Methods 
 
Other defensive methods include raising the total number of allowed 
connections to increase the survivability of server and shorten the connections timeout 
so that the idle or not responding connections could be terminated faster. Besides 
these, ingress filtering makes sure the incoming packets are actually from the networks 
that they claimed to be from and egress filtering prevents unauthorized traffic from 
leaving the internal network (Ferguson & Senie, 2000). Nevertheless, the first two 
techniques raise other problems, such as longer time to locate the TCP Control Block 
when the connection table is large and the server might drop legitimate clients if a 
connection timed out too fast. Also, the global deployment of ingress and egress 
filtering is neither guaranteed nor likely while the attacker can use compromised 
zombies to bypass the filtering (Eddy, 2007; Mirkovic et al., 2004; Faber et al., 1999). 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
We have reviewed some related defensive methods in this chapter, which are, 
IKEv2 with IPSec, computation intensive puzzle and CAPTCHA. The summary is listed 
in Table 2.2. Detection and filtering mechanisms limit the attack traffic; IKE and IPSec 
provide a set of security suite including authentication to identify the remote peer; 
Computational intensive puzzle and CAPTCHA protect server against automated 
attack. 
 
However, the threat of Naptha attack still exists due to the limitations of the 
defence techniques or Naptha attack is outside the coverage of a protection schemes. 
Although a system administrator could minimize the impact of Naptha attack through 
proper configurations and complicated network surveillance system, we proposed a 
simple and transaction saving method to guard servers against Naptha attack in the 
next chapter. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Related Defensive Methods 
 
Method Strength Limitation 
Detection and 
Filtering 
• Detect almost instantly any 
statistical change to 
incoming and outgoing 
traffic.  
• Normally the action taken is 
rate limiting. 
• Since the attack traffic could 
not be isolated, Naptha 
attack still can get through 
the firewall. 
• False positive and false 
negative 
IKE and IPSec • Provide confidentiality, data 
origin authentication, anti-
replay, and connectionless 
integrity. 
• Security features depend on 
system configuration which 
controlled by system 
administrator, not end user.  
• It does not identify and block 
attack traffic from getting 
through IPSec. 
Computational 
Intensive 
Puzzle 
• The client must solve a 
puzzle in order to get 
access.  
• This slow down the attacker 
from filling up the resource 
rapidly.  
• The system might drop 
legitimate client who uses 
slow machine. 
CAPTCHA • Generate test that is hard to 
be solved by machines and 
hence it prevent automated 
attack. 
• Many algorithms used to 
generate the test already 
broke by attackers. 
Increase 
Process Slots 
• Increase the survivability of 
server against Naptha 
attack. 
• Performance drops when 
the TCB grows. 
Reduce 
Session 
Timeout 
• Clear idle connection faster. • Legitimate client get 
disconnected from server 
frequently. 
Ingress/Egress 
Filtering 
• Make sure the incoming 
traffic from router is from 
where it claims to be from. 
• Prevent unauthorized traffic 
from leaving the network. 
• Global deployment is neither 
guaranteed nor likely.  
• Attack from zombies using 
valid IP address is not 
filtered. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
We have already seen that the root cause of successful Naptha attack is 
resources allocation to all incoming requests. Those requests were not verified nor 
identified first before the server allocates TCB to them. The challenge to Naptha attack 
protection is to differentiate legitimate traffics and attack traffics from the daily packets 
flow. In this chapter, we take FTP as an example to illustrate the problem in current 
TCP stack implementation, then, we propose Early Client Authentication Method 
(ECAM) to overcome the problem by identifying each and every request during 
connection establishment and to isolate the Naptha attack traffics. Advantages and 
security considerations regarding the ECAM are also discussed in this chapter. 
 
3.1 File Transfer Protocol (FTP) 
 
The main objective of FTP is to enable file sharing among hosts across the 
Internet (Postel & Reynolds, 1985). We concentrate our discussion on the initial 
exchange between FTP client and FTP server, the weaknesses in FTP and how the 
attacker launches Naptha attack on the server. Figure 3.1 illustrates the transactions 
between FTP client and FTP server in details. The first three transactions is the three-
way handshake we described in section 1.2. It followed by the FTP user login process. 
When the client’s machine received server ready message, it prompts user for login 
name. Next, the server asks the client for password of the login name. Finally, the 
server sends welcome message and login successfully message to the client if both 
the username and password are correct. Notice that the server acknowledges all 
messages sent from client, so does the client, who acknowledges all messages sent 
from the server. Acknowledgment could be made cumulatively, which acknowledges 
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two or more messages from the peer, as did by the client at the end of the login 
process. 
 
 
 
 
TCP SYN
TCP SYN+ACK
TCP ACK
FTP 220
USER ftp
TCP ACK
FTP 331
TCP ACK
PASS ftp@ftp.com
TCP ACK
FTP 230
FTP 230
TCP ACK
Client initiate a connection 
request to FTP server
The server responds with SYN + 
ACK
Client responds with ACK
Server sends FTP Server Ready
TCP ACK
Client acknowledges FTP 220
Client logins using user name “ftp”
Server acknowledges USER login
Server requests for password
Client acknowledges FTP 331
Client sends password
Server acknowledges the client that 
the password is received
Welcome message from server
User “ftp” logged in notification
Client acknowledges the messages 
sent from server
Display Server Ready Message 
Prompt for login name.
User input login name
Prompt for password
User input password
FTP Client FTP Server
User starts FTP client and 
wishes to connect to ftp server
Output server massage
Output server massage
Figure 3.1: Three-way Handshake and FTP Login Process 
 
 
When the FTP server starts, it creates a process which always waiting to accept 
new client connection. For each accepted connection, the server spawns a new child 
process which will handle all server-client operation, such as client login process, file 
transfer and client session termination. The purpose of child process spawning is to 
support multiple concurrent client requests at a time and it is created once the three-
way handshake is completed. Figure 3.2 illustrates the state of FTP server accepts 
new connection and spawns new child process when a connection is established. The 
problems are there is a limit to the maximum concurrent processes that could co-exist 
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on a machine and that the server did not identify the peer first before spawning new 
process. This means, one attack connection request also consumes one process slot. 
The server could not simply terminate a connection within a short time frame because it 
must wait for reply from the client during client identification process. The server rejects 
new connection request when the process table is full. An attacker could fill up the 
table easily by flooding the server using only connection requests, and this is what 
happening during Naptha attack. There is not much things that a network administrator 
could do because of the similarity of attack traffic to the normal traffic. 
 
 
 
Waiting to 
Accept New 
Connection
Spawning 
New Child 
Process
Server-Client 
operation
New Connection Accepted 
(three-way handshake 
completed)
Loop
Client Request and Server 
Response Loop
Child Process 
Termination
Connection Ended 
or Timed OutMain Process
Child Process
Client 
Authentication 
Process
SPAWN
LOGIN OK
Figure 3.2: State of Current Server when A New Connection is Established 
 
 
3.2 Early Client Authentication Method (ECAM) 
 
In order to distinguish between the attack connections and legitimate 
connections, there is a need to verify the genuineness of all incoming requests. We 
propose Early Client Authentication Method to include login information in the third 
handshake of connection establishment. This action is completely legal and it does not 
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violate Transmission Control Protocol stated in RFC 793 (Postel, 1981). Figure 3.3 
illustrates the idea of ECAM and Figure 3.4 shows the advantages of ECAM. 
 
 
 
 
ECAM Client  ECAM SERVER
SYN
SYN, ACK
LOGIN, ACK
 
 
Figure 3.3: Early Client Authentication Method 
 
 
 
 
ECAM
Transparent to applicationProtect server against
Naptha attack
Simple
Capable to integrated to security
protocols such as IPSec, zero
knowledge password proof with
no contradiction.
Transaction saving
Provides better solution then
filtering, no false positive, no
false negative
Figure 3.4: Advantages of ECAM 
 
 
There are many advantages of ECAM. First is the protection against Naptha 
attack, which is our main purpose. Naptha attack launches a DoS attack by depleting 
the free process slot using only simple connection requests. For that large amount of 
connection requests, the server could not simply terminate them. As shown in Figure 
3.1, the server must wait for human responses twice in order to verify the peer, once 
for the login name and another for the password. The waiting time lasted for at least a 
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few seconds each, which creates a ‘golden period’ for the attacker to launch a flooding 
attack. During this period, the server could not drop that connection. With ECAM, each 
and every request must be appended with login information. Since there is no waiting 
time during the login period, as shown in Figure 3.5, and no unauthorized access to the 
process table, we can assure that the Naptha attack will never be succeed. 
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TCP SYN+ACK
TCP ACK+LOGIN
TCP ACK
FTP 230
FTP 230
TCP ACK
Client initiate a connection 
request to ECAM server
The server responds with SYN + 
ACK
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Server acknowledges the client that 
the login is received
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User “ftp” logged in notification
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User input password
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User starts FTP client and 
wishes to connect to ftp server
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Output server message
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Figure 3.5: Three-way Handshake and FTP Login Process using ECAM 
 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the three-way handshake and FTP login process using 
ECAM. By comparing Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.1, we see that current FTP uses 14 
transactions to login the system while FTP with ECAM uses only 7 transactions, which 
is half of the original FTP. Obviously, ECAM consumes much less bandwidth. If both 
the FTP and FTP-ECAM were given a limited bandwidth, FTP-ECAM system could 
certainly serve more clients. We gain better performance in FTP-ECAM. 
 
 22
As mentioned in Chapter 2, statistical modelling and filtering mechanisms are 
not able to isolate or stop Naptha attack. Moreover, those mechanisms might produce 
false positive and false negative results. Also, the threshold setting to trigger the 
filtering action is different from site to site and it is possible to be tricked by an attacker. 
ECAM on the other hand, does not need extra computational power to model the 
incoming and outgoing traffic. There is no threshold setting too, ECAM just stays in the 
system, identify the requests and isolates the attack. 
 
ECAM is implemented at the kernel of an operating system. Any application that 
uses TCP/IP, such as email server and email client; file storage server and file storage 
client; web server and we client, could take advantage of it. Network programmer does 
not have to write their own function for each program in order to prevent Naptha attack. 
He/She just needs to enable the ECAM communication at the TCP socket and the 
operating system will handle the attack silently. 
 
By inspection, ECAM is simple and efficient. It uses less computation and 
transactions than normal TCP/IP communication but yet, ECAM is capable to defeat 
the Naptha attack. It does not employ long mathematic to judge if an attack has took 
place. It simply identifies the client at the beginning of a connection. Our intention is not 
to complicate the problem, but to solve the attack effectively. 
 
ECAM could be used with any other security protocol which tries to provide 
secure communication across the Internet without contradiction. Currently, the Secure 
Remote Password (SRP), a zero knowledge password proof security protocol, 
negotiates a security session with the peer after the three-way handshake, which is 
vulnerable to Naptha attack. The vulnerability is not due to the protocol itself, but where 
it takes place. The negotiation could actually be carried out earlier by integrated with 
ECAM to protect the server against the attack. There is no contradiction because the 
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area of research is different. SRP is a protocol to allow the server to identify the client 
without having the client to actually send out the password while ECAM concentrates 
on Naptha DoS attack. 
 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the state of ECAM server when a new connection is 
established. Previously, we mentioned that the current server could not terminate an 
unauthorized connection because the client might in the process of login the server. In 
ECAM however, the state is eliminated. The username and password is collected by 
the ECAM client in the early stage and the server could proceed with client 
authentication process immediately without client input. In this way, we can assure that 
the process table will never be filled by unauthorized connection. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: State of ECAM Server when A New Connection is Established 
 
 
3.3 Security Considerations 
 
The login information sent from client to server is in plaintext form. This means, 
if an attacker could grab the third packet in three-way handshake, he stole the access 
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